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Abstract:
Systems of indirect voting based on the principle of qualified majority can
be analysed using the methods of game theory. In particular, this applies to
the voting system in the Council of the European Union, which was recently a
subject of a vivid political discussion. The a priori voting power of a voter mea-
sures his potential influence over the decisions of the voting body under a given
decision rule. We investigate a system based on the law of Penrose, in which
each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes (the voting
weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents.
Here we demonstrate that for a generic distribution of the population there ex-
ists an optimal quota for which the voting power of any state is proportional to
its weight. The optimal quota is shown to decrease with the number of voting
countries.
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Voting rules implemented by various political or economical bodies may be
studied with the help of the tools developed for many decades in game theory
[38, 6, 14, 17]. We are going to analyse a special case of indirect voting: each
citizen of a given country elects a representative, who will cast a ballot in the
voting body on behalf of his electors. The decisions of such a body are taken if
certain fixed conditions characterising qualified majority (the winning coalition)
are fulfilled. For instance, according to the agreement reached in Brussels in
June 2004 and signed in Rome in October 2004, the Council of Ministers of the
European Union (EU) acting on a proposal from the Commission or from the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs takes its decisions if two criteria are simul-
taneously satisfied: a) at least 55% of members of the Council, comprising at
least fifteen of them vote ’yes’, and b) these members represent Member States
comprising at least 65% of the total population of the Union. Additionally: c) a
blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the
qualified majority shall be deemed attained. The same rules apply to the Euro-
pean Council when it is acting by a qualified majority (The Treaty Establishing
a Constitution for Europe, 2004, see [48]).
A mathematical theory of indirect voting was initiated after World War II by
British psychiatrist and mathematician Lionel S. Penrose (1946) in the context
of a hypothetical distribution of votes in the UN General Assembly [38]. He
introduced the concept of a priori voting power, a quantity measuring the ability
of a participant X of the voting body to influence the decisions taken. In 1965
a similar analysis was independently carried out by American attorney John F.
Banzhaf III [5]. The voting power is proportional to the probability that a vote
cast by X in a hypothetical ballot will be decisive: a winning coalition would
fail to satisfy the qualified majority condition without X or a losing coalition
would start to satisfy it with X . If we assume that all potential coalitions
are equally probable, then the voting power may be expressed by the Penrose-
Banzhaf index (PBI) [14, 17], called also the Banzhaf index. For convenience
one often normalises the PBIs in such a way that their sum is equal to unity.
The relative voting power should be distinguished from the voting weight: a
shareholder with 51% of stocks of a company has only 51% of all votes at the
shareholders assembly, but he takes 100% of the voting power if the assembly
votes by a simple majority rule. Note that this approach is purely normative,
not descriptive: we are interested in the a priori voting power arising from the
voting procedure itself. The actual voting power depends on the polarisation of
opinion in the voting body and changes from voting to voting [20, 19, 37, 21].
To compute the PBIs of M participants of a voting system which follows
a given set of rules one needs to consider all possible 2M coalitions to check
which of them satisfies the qualified majority condition, and to count those
for which the voice of a given participant is decisive. In the case of the EU
consisting of 25 (or in the near future 27) states, there are more than 33.5 (or,
respectively, 134) millions of possible coalitions. A game-theoretical analysis of
the rules of voting in the European Council performed along those lines shows
[13, 4, 5, 11, 39] that the double majority system laid down in 2003 by the
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European Convention attributes a much smaller relative voting power to Spain
and Poland than the earlier system accepted in the Treaty of Nice in 2001. In
this way we obtain a mathematical explanation of the political fact that these
two countries were the main opponents of the proposed changes to the voting
rules [5, 11, 1].
To describe an algorithm of computing the PBIs assume that ω is the number
of winning coalitions, in the sense that they satisfy the qualified majority rule
adopted. There exist 2M−1 different coalitions in which a given country can
take part. Let ωx denote the number of winning coalitions that include the
country x. Assuming that all 2M coalitions are equally likely we can compute the
probability that a vote cast by x is decisive. This happens, if x is a critical voter
in a coalition, i.e., the winning coalition (with x) ceases to fulfil the majority
requirements without x. The number of these cases is: ηx = ωx − (ω − ωx) =
2ωx−ω. The absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index is equal to the probability that x is
critical: Bx = ηx/2
M−1. To compare these indices for decision bodies consisting
of different number of players, it is convenient to define the normalised Penrose-
Banzhaf index: βx =
(∑M
x=1 ηx
)
−1
ηx. Penrose mentioned in 1946 that in this
model the probability px that the country x is on the ‘winning’ side reads:
px = (ωx +
(
2M−1 − (ω − ωx)
)
)/2M =
1 +Bx
2
,
and so it is a function of the absolute Banzhaf index.
Which voting system is fairer and more accurate? A partial answer to this
question was already given by Penrose [38], who deliberated principles of an
ideal representative voting system, in which every citizen of every country has
the same potential voting power. First consider direct elections of the govern-
ment (which nominates the minister voting on behalf of the entire country in
the European Council) in a state with population N . It is easy to imagine that
an average German citizen has smaller influence on the election of his govern-
ment than, for example, a citizen of the neighbouring Luxembourg. Making
use of the Bernoulli scheme and the Stirling approximation of the binomials,
Penrose proved that in such elections the voting power of a single citizen decays
as 1/
√
N , given that the votes of citizens are uncorrelated. Thus, the system
of indirect voting applied to the European Council would be representative in
this sense, if the voting power of each country behaved proportionally to
√
N ,
so that both factors cancelled out. (This has a direct physical analogy with
the random walk of a diffusing particle [43].) This statement, known in the
literature under the name of the square root law of Penrose [14], was indepen-
dently proposed in the EU context by Laruelle and Widgre´n [27], see [26] for an
earlier version. Since then potential voting systems in the EU Council of Min-
isters that obey Penrose’s square root law have been analysed by many authors
[3, 15, 22, 16, 25, 34, 47, 49, 39, 24, 46]. (Other arguments for the optimal-
ity of the square root formula can be found in [40, 33, 8, 7, 32].) Such voting
procedures has been also used in practice in other international institutions,
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for example, in the Canadian Geoscience Council, the International Federa-
tion of Operational Research Societies, the International Genetics Federation,
the International Mycological Association, and the World Federalist Movement.
However, it is not clear in general how to solve directly the inverse problem,
i.e., how to allocate weights and how to define qualified majority rules to obtain
required distribution of power [27, 45, 28, 31, 50, 36].
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Figure 1: Ratio of voting power to voting weight as a function of the quota for
five exemplary states of EU-25 (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, France,
and Germany); all functions cross near the critical point R25opt = 62%.
To this end we proposed [42, 51] a voting system exploiting a single criterion:
the voting weight of each Member State is allocated proportionally to the square
root of its population, the decision of the Council being taken if the sum of
weights exceeds a certain quota (threshold) R. Taking the populations Nx
(x = 1, . . . , 25) of all 25 EU member states as of 1 January 20031 we analysed
their voting powers in this system as functions of the quota R. Fig. 1 shows the
ratio of the normalised PBIs βx (R) to the voting weights proportional to
√
Nx
for five exemplary states. Interestingly, all 25 curves (for transparency only
5 are plotted here) cross approximately at a single point for a critical quota
R25opt = 62%. Fig. 2 illustrates the dependence of the square root of the sum
of square residuals σ between the normalised PBIs and voting weights on the
1data from EUROSTAT : First results of the demographic data collection for 2003 in Eu-
rope. Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 2004; 13; 1-7.
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value of the threshold R, where
σ2 =
M∑
x=1
(
βx (R)−
√
Nx/
M∑
y=1
√
Ny
)2
.
Since the minimum value of this function attained for R25opt is very small (ap-
proximately 0.0003), we are able to work out the optimal value for the threshold
for which both the voting powers and weights coincide. For this very choice of
the quota the computed voting power of each country is practically equal to
the attributed voting weight, and so it is proportional to the square root of the
population. Hence the Penrose law is almost exactly fulfilled, and the potential
influence of every citizen of each Member State on the decisions taken in the
Council is the same. Such a voting system is not only representative but also
transparent: the voting powers are proportional to the voting weights. Further-
more, the system is simple (one criterion only), easily extendible and objective:
it does not favour nor handicap any European country. It has been christened
by the media as the ‘Jagiellonian Compromise’.
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Figure 2: The cumulative residual σ between the voting weight and power for
all EU-25 countries as dependent on the value of the threshold R.
The main result of our work consists in the statement that the above method
is not restricted to the actual distribution of population in European countries.
Performing similar investigations for a hundred randomly chosen populations of
fictitious ‘Unions’ containingM states each, for every realisation we have found
a critical quota Ropt at which the voting powers of all ‘members’ approximately
coincide with the weights allocated. Thus, our method provides in many cases
a surprisingly simple solution of the inverse problem. The value of the critical
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quota is realisation dependent, but for a fixed M the fluctuations are small.
Moreover, the critical quota decreases with the size of the ‘Union’, which is
rather intuitive: the more countries, the more difficult it becomes to construct a
winning coalition. For instance, for the Council of Ministers of EU-27 (including
also Roumania and Bulgaria) the optimal quota R27opt ≃ 61.4%, see Tab. 1.
Member State Population Voting power Voting weight Voting power
(in millions) (Constitution) (Penrose) (Penrose)
Germany 82.54 11.87 9.55 9.54
France 59.64 8.74 8.11 8.12
United Kingdom 59.33 8.69 8.09 8.10
Italy 57.32 8.44 7.95 7.96
Spain 41.55 6.37 6.78 6.79
Poland 38.22 5.89 6.49 6.50
Roumania 21.77 4.22 4.91 4.91
Netherlands 16.19 3.51 4.22 4.22
Greece 11.01 2.88 3.49 3.49
Portugal 10.41 2.80 3.39 3.39
Belgium 10.36 2.80 3.38 3.38
Czech Republic 10.20 2.78 3.35 3.35
Hungary 10.14 2.77 3.34 3.34
Sweden 8.94 2.63 3.14 3.14
Austria 8.08 2.52 2.98 2.98
Bulgaria 7.85 2.49 2.94 2.94
Denmark 5.38 2.19 2.44 2.44
Slovakia 5.38 2.19 2.44 2.44
Finland 5.21 2.17 2.39 2.39
Ireland 3.96 2.02 2.09 2.09
Lithuania 3.46 1.96 1.95 1.95
Latvia 2.33 1.82 1.61 1.61
Slovenia 2.00 1.78 1.48 1.48
Estonia 1.36 1.70 1.23 1.23
Cyprus 0.72 1.62 0.89 0.89
Luxembourg 0.45 1.59 0.70 0.70
Malta 0.40 1.58 0.66 0.66
Table 1. Comparison of voting power of EU-27 member states in the sys-
tem of the European Constitution and in the proposed solution (‘Jagiellonian
Compromise’) based on the Penrose law with the threshold R27opt = 61.4%.
In the limiting case as M → ∞ the critical quota seems to tend to 50%,
consistently with the so-called Penrose limit theorem [30, 31]. The existence
of the optimal quota was confirmed in a recent study by Chang, Chua, and
Machover [12] who, however, used different measure on the set of distributions
of population. Tab. 2 shows the value of the mean critical quota as a function
6
of the number M of members of the voting body obtained by averaging over
the random population generated with respect to the statistical measure, i.e.,
the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with Jeffreys’ priors [41] with the density
given by
P (x1,...,xM ) = CM (x1 · . . . · xM )−1/2
for xi ≥ 0,
∑M
i=1 xi = 1, where the normalisation constant is expressed by the
Euler gamma function, CM := Γ (M/2)pi
−M/2. This measure on the simplex
of probability distributions has been selected since it is induced by the Fisher-
Mahalanobis-Battacharyya-Rao Riemannian metric on this set, which in turn
is distinguished by being invariant under reparametrisation [2].
M 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
RMopt 66.0% 65.8% 64.6% 64.4% 63.4% 63.1% 62.6% 62.0% 61.4%
Table 2. Average optimal threshold RMopt as a function of the number of
states M .
The above result has a simple practical meaning: for a given number of states
M , choosing weights proportional to the square root of the population and the
quota in the close vicinity of RMopt we assure that the system is (according to
the Penrose law) nearly optimally representative, since the voting power of each
country becomes proportional to the square root of its population, and so the
voting power of every citizen of each state is nearly the same.
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Figure 3: Differences in voting power in the EU-27 Council between the system
of the European Constitution and the proposed solution (‘Jagiellonian Compro-
mise’) based on the Penrose law with R27opt = 61.4%. The member states are
ordered according to their population.
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The representative voting system based on the square root law of Penrose
and the appropriate choice of optimal quota may be used as a reference point to
analyse the rules established by politicians. Fig. 3 presents a comparison of the
voting power (measured by the PBI) of EU members according to the system
accepted in Brussels in June 2004 (applied to EU-27, including also Roumania
and Bulgaria) and according to the Penrose solution with the optimal quota
R27opt = 61.4%, see [9, 10, 18, 23, 44] for similar analyses. The double majority
rule is beneficial to the largest countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Italy), due to the ‘per capita’ criterion, and to the smallest countries (from
Latvia to Malta), for which the condition ‘per state’ plays a key role. Since
the largest and the smallest countries gain relative voting power, it is easy to
see that this occurs at the expense of all the medium-sized countries (from
Spain to Ireland), which from this point of view are handicapped by the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
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